The launching of the Barcelona process was an ambitious exercise.
Borrowing from the CSCE experience in Europe, the Declaration signed in Barcelona in November 1995 outlined three broad objectives:
• to strengthen political dialogue on a regular basis with the eventual aim of establishing a common area of peace and stability, including respect for human rights and democracy;
• the creation of a shared zone of prosperity through the establishment of a free trade area and a substantial increase in financial support from the European Union to attend to the social and economic challenges which come with transition;
• the development of an active civil society and the promotion of understanding between different cultures and exchanges at the level of civil society.
The driving force behind the launching of the Barcelona process was the belief that the root causes of instability in the Mediterranean region were economic underdevelopment and social inequality, and that these issues needed to be tackled collectively within a multilateral framework. Economic incentives remained the main tool in the hands of the European Union in dealing with the potential security threats arising from its southern shores, but they would be complemented by political dialogue and extensive cooperation in social and cultural affairs. Enhanced economic cooperation through the creation of a free trade zone in the Mediterranean region by 2010 would be accompanied by the development of a new set of cooperative frameworks for future political, security and civil relations.
The underlying assumptions and approach of the Barcelona process reflected the increasingly prevalent approach of 'cooperative security', namely that of addressing security from more than just a military perspective. In the post-Cold War era, attention was increasingly directed towards dealing with the underlying causes of conflict and with the need to bring states together to address the root causes of conflict and to promote confidence building and partnership measures, rather than a reliance on deterrence and containment. The concept of threat to regional stability and security was no longer defined simply in terms of inter-state conflict. Although the military dimension of security and the potential for inter-state conflict were not totally overlooked in the The distinction between the Barcelona process and the Middle East process was rhetorical. From the outset the fortunes of the two processes were clearly intertwined. The European Union had given little thought to how it intended to prevent any potential setbacks in the Arab-Israeli peace process from spilling over and affecting the Barcelona process, and to whether it possessed the capacity to mediate those potential crises within the Barcelona framework.
Equally, it was unclear whether Israel and the Arab states would look to Europe to play such a role and if they would use the Barcelona process to overcome their differences and allow the development of confidence building measures.
The track-record of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has been mixed. Proponents of the process view achievements such as the signing of the Association Agreements, the increase in trade, the framework for dialogue at the political level, the mobilization of funds for the region, and the establishment of a series of networks connecting groups from civil society, as highly significant. But for many commentators, the balance sheet of the Barcelona process has been dismal and its value and utility questionable. Five years after the signing of the Barcelona Declaration, the European Commission, in a brutally honest assessment, was forced to conclude that achievements had been inadequate and that new life and energy needed to be injected into the process. Difficulties in the Middle East peace process have slowed progress and limited the extent to which full regional cooperation could develop. Not only are the countries in the region very different in terms of political systems and levels of economic development, but some are much more affected by the evolution of the peace process than others. Willingness to cooperate more actively with neighbours has been held back by the politics of the peace process.
It went on to conclude, somewhat bitterly:
Deadlock and slow advances in the Middle East Peace Process, albeit separate from the Barcelona Process, has a retarding effect on regional cooperation in general. These shortcomings were so substantial as call into question the political determination of both sides to achieve the goals they set in 1995. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership has failed, so far, to achieve the regional goals that the partners to the process set out for themselves eight years ago in Barcelona. Although there has been a significant Europe initiative is an acknowledgement by the European Union that its approach to future relations with its neighbouring states will be conducted not through a 'one-size-fits all policy,' but will involve taking into account the varying socio-economic standing of each country.
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At some point Israel and the Palestinians will need to return to the negotiating But any future initiatives will need to be far more modest than the grandiose schemes laid out in the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995. The European Union will need to take into account the constraints facing Israel and the Arab states and to draw upon the lessons learned from the failings of the Barcelona process. It will require imagination, determination and leadership. But it is a challenge which none of the parties can afford to ignore.
